

## **PPI Briefing Note Number 79**

#### Introduction

Scheme (LGPS) has 5 million schemes which are unfunded. members (active, deferred and provide the LGPS for their em- structure in the UK. ployees by becoming admitted bodies.

The LGPS provides salary-related, vious Government reforms.

£192.1bn,1 as a funded scheme, it questions to be considered as the The Local Government Pension is different to other public sector LGPS changes are implemented.

#### **History of the LGPS**

pensioner) making it one of the The LGPS is under continued In the late 1980's the government largest open DB schemes in Eng- pressure to deal with scheme defi- reduced target funding levels for land and Wales. Employers in the cits (£47bn)<sup>2</sup> by improving invest- pension schemes. Many DB scheme include local authorities ment returns and reducing admin- schemes, including the LGPS and public service organisations istration costs, and more recently were in surplus at the time and as well as other employers which pressure to invest more in infra- reduced or ceased paying contri-

butions for a number of years. Although considered an appro-

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This briefing note covers some of priate response at the time, the the history of LGPS including pre- short term benefits were out-It weighed by the subsequent poor Defined Benefits (DB), where the discusses the current proposed market performance and many individual's pension entitlement changes (including the pooling of schemes are still in deficit today. is not dependent upon investment funds and increased investment in

performance. The scheme is ad- infrastructure in the UK) across There are other elements in addiministered for participating em- four elements (scale, costs, gov- tion to the contribution reduction ployers locally through 89 funds ernance and infrastructure) along and holidays such as longevity in England and Wales. The with possible partnership arrange- and investment returns, that have scheme has assets of around ments. It seeks to outline further contributed to building up the deficit.

#### **Chart 1: Timeline of reforms** to the LGPS October 2015

March 2013 Increase in limit on investing in partnerships from 15% to 30% so funds merging funds can diversify investments

May 2013 Consultation on merger of funds, **Hymans Robertson** looked at potential options for structural reform

*Investments* 

May 2014 The government responded to the May 2013 consultation and announced that it would not pursue

The Government announced a further consultation on the use of collective investment vehicles as they believed that the benefits of a merger could be achieved faster and more simply this way

The government responded to May 2014 consultation and announced that that the LGPS funds would be required to pool their assets into six pools, investing in infrastructure regulations to close on to "get Britain building"

November 2015 The criteria and guidance for pooling assets and investing infrastructure was released alongside a consultation on revoking and replacing the management regulations by DČLG



February 2016 Consultation on revoking and replacing the management the 19th February, authorities are in the midst of building their pooling proposals

March 2016 further announcements are expected regarding the reforms to the LGPS

2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: House of commons library (2015), Local Government Pension Scheme

Hutton of Furness' Independent Public Service Pensions Commission report suggested incentivising the merger of funds.<sup>3</sup> Following this there has been a number of consultations considering structural reform for the LGPS. Chart 1 looks at the timeline of on-going reforms to the LGPS. Recent focus has been on sustainability and effectiveness, cost while improving the rate of return.

In March 2011, Lord

PPI Briefing Notes clarify topical issues in pensions policy.



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and investing infrastructure was regulations: released by the Department for 1. The removal of prescribed iii. Improving governance; and Communities and Local Government (DCLG)

Administering authorities have to respond to the Government with their proposals by 19 February 2. Introducing safeguards to en-generates the opportunity for 2016. Amongst the detailed criteria (Chart 2) it states that the 89 administering authorities in England and Wales must collaborate to create 6 pools that are at least £25bn in size. The Government considers In addition, the consultation intro- This could lead to the reduction that this is a sufficient number so that it removes duplicate activities as well as reduces management to the Secretary of State to intercosts.4

Criteria were published alongside needed. a DCLG consultation about revoking and replacing the LGPS man- The four key areas of reform

On 25 November 2015, the criteria regulations.<sup>5</sup> The consultation in- focus on four main areas: and guidance for pooling assets cluded two main changes to the i. Scale;

- means of securing a diversified iv. Investing in infrastructure. investment strategy and placing decisions about investments i. Scale with authorities.
- sure that the more flexible leg- the funds to reduce operational islation in the criteria and the costs and invest in infrastrucguidance on pooling of assets is ture. Consolidation of 89 funds adhered to correctly.

duced backstop legislation. This in the number of investment suggested that powers were given managers required.

vene in the investment function of There are various advantages of administering authority an

agement and investment of funds Overall, the reforms to the LGPS alternative assets, such as infra-

ii. Reducing cost;

Building economies of scale into 6 pools means that each pool represents 'one client'.

if pooling assets. For example, larger investors have greater leverage over charges and typically more access to invest in

# **Chart 2: Pooling Criteria**

Asset pools must achieve benefits of scale

- The size of the pool once fully operational
- Rationale for maintaining assets outside of the pool
- The type and legal structure of the collaborative vehicle
- How the pool will operate
- Timetable for establishing the pool

Strong governance and decision making

- Maintenance of appropriate management and oversight at local level
- Adequate risk management and assessment at pool level
- Governance structure of the pool including accountability of local/pool level

#### Reduced costs and excellent value for monev

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- Active management must be shown to deliver value for money on a riskadjusted, long-term basis
- A full transparent assessment of investment costs and fees as at March 31 2013
- A detailed forecast estimate of savings over the next 15 years

#### An improved capacity to invest in infrastructure

- Current allocation to infrastructure
- Planned allocation to infrastructure
- Plans for developing capacity and capability to assess infrastructure projects

structure.

Although the increase in size may unlock access to certain investments and be beneficial in achieving cost savings it also comes with risks. For example, there can be size restrictions on certain investments or funds. Similarly larger funds can be too big to fulfil their target allocation (the amount that the LGPS aims to allocate to each asset) within a preferred manager or direct investment opportunity. Other risks include difficulty in switching in and out of the large position and possible delays in

Source: DCLG (2015), Local Government Pensions Scheme: Investment Reform Criteria and Guidance

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right size to unlock all the benefits. tion that the scheme is in now.

#### ii. Reducing cost

The reduction of operational costs ed to be between £200m and airports, power stations, elecis expected through building econ- £260m, this amount is relatively tricity pipelines and power staomies of scale and moving from low compared to the deficit that tions. There are many adactive to passive management of the scheme has built up (£47bn). assets. The report suggested that a move from active to passive man- The root causes of the deficit may economic growth, diversifying agement for equities and bonds not be directly addressed within the investment portfolio and could save between £200m to these reforms as there are other the potential of producing long-£260m.8 The modelling uses a set elements (such as contribution term returns. However, there of assumptions which are based holidays, longevity, investment can also be many disadvantages on a subset of the funds (18). As returns) that have contributed to such as construction risks, high with all models, it is based on spe-building up the deficit. cific assumptions and a sample rather than a complete dataset, so iii. Governance there remains a degree of uncer- The Government expects that the There has been little investment performed well, it found that making of the LGPS. across the sample, in aggregate, equity performance before fees Authorities are in the process of location. Chart 3 shows the had been no better than the index. designing their governance struc- lack of investment generally by The estimated savings therefore tures for their pools which in- the LGPS into this asset class. assume that there is no benefit in cludes the accountability between Within the 'other' asset class terms of higher returns from ac- the pools and the structure for the (5.7%) infrastructure investtive management.

show that active management de- considerations that arise from alclass compares to a passive index. regulations which introduces set up an independent National

that all decisions that are made by to intervene if the criteria is not Local Authorities are with a long- adhered to correctly.9 'Big' is also a subjective term. term view adopting a 'culture of Within pension funds a big fund continuous improvement'. How- iv. Infrastructure in one country may be considered ever, it may also be useful to con- The final focus of the reforms is small in another.7 It is difficult to sider how much of the cost sav- around increased investment know whether the £25bn that the ings will deal with the problems into infrastructure in the UK. Government has suggested is the that have contributed to the posi-

Although cost savings are predict- toll roads, railways, seaports,

tainty around these estimates. Alt- pooling of assets will induce by the LGPS into infrastructure hough the report recognises that strong governance, increase trans- in recent years as they have some actively managed funds had parency and improve the decision generally utilised alternative

internal management that is ex- ment stands at 6%, reported in pected to take place. However, the scheme annual report Current criteria requires funds to there are practical and operational 2014.11 livers value for money on a risk lowing governance to be struc- National Infrastructure Comadjusted long term basis (Chart 2). tured this way, the Government mission Authorities have been asked to has recognised this and have is- In response to a perceived lack report on how fees and the net sued a consultation on revoking of expertise to invest in infraperformance for each active asset and replacing the management structure, the Government has

execution of investment deci- The Government has recognised powers to the Secretary of State

Infrastructure assets include physical investments such as: vantages of investing in infrastructure such as promoting investment costs and lower returns.<sup>10</sup>

forms of illiquid investments to achieve their strategic asset al-

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platform to encourage invest- da and Australia frastructure in the UK.<sup>12</sup>


Infrastructure Commission as a Experience from overseas; Cana- nal management.<sup>13</sup> Chart 4 looks

ment into this area and to over- In Canada and Australia, consoli- these countries, the key trends see the long-term strategic deci- dation of pension funds has been a include fund consolidation spesion making with regards to in- prominent trend, alongside invest- cifically in Australia where funds ment into infrastructure and inter- are projected to decline from 447

# Chart 3: Total assets of LGPS @ March 2014



### This chart shows where the assets of the LGPS were placed in 2014



### PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE **Chart 4: Global Comparisons of** pension funds

## Australia

- The trend of consolidation is prominent in Australia where superannuation funds are projected to decline from 447 to 74 by 2035 due to the consolidation of funds.
- Operational costs of pensions are said to be 40% lower than the UK as inhouse investment management is increasing.
- Australian pension funds have been increasing investment in infrastructure since 1990's. Australia alongside Canada has the highest asset allocation dedicated to infrastructure which is around 5%, compared to the global average of 1%.

## Canada

- There is an increasing trend in Canada towards in-house investment management specifically in larger plans and investments in infrastructure which is also increasing such as the UK's High Speed One rail line.
- There is a decline in DB schemes and an increase in pooled registered pension plans (PPRP) a scheme designed for those who do not have a workplace pension. Members benefit from low admin costs due to the pooling of assets.
- Canadian pension assets grew 6.8 per cent between 2007 and 2012 and outperformed UK and Dutch assets, which grew 0.4 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively.

at the emerging trends from

to 74 by 2035. Another key trend is that both countries have been acknowledged as top investors into infrastructure with the highest asset allocation of around 5% compared to the global average of 1%.

The DCLG criteria states that there will be increased investment into the infrastructure asset class by the pools. There is a potential trade-off that arises from this regarding state social responsibility and how it fits with the fiduciary duty to scheme members. Although investment into infrastructure is beneficial for the economy, it may not be beneficial for each individual LGPS member. Forcing investment into infrastructure will restrict the pool members investment choice and may not be suitable or desired by each individual, this in turn interacts with the fiduciary duty to scheme members.

Infrastructure projects pose a variety of risks, such as time scale, construction risks, phase of investment (build vs. operational) and rate of returns making it a non-homogenous asset

Source: OECD (2013), Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure: A comparison between Australia and Canada



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class. Investment in individual infrastructure projects would need to be matched with specific fund objectives.

#### **Possible pooling arrangements**

In terms of how funds will be brought together, there are a number of possibilities. Specifically:

Those with a like-minded approach

Schemes with a like-minded approach are likely to form partnerships. For example, London and Lancashire who signed a partnership agreement in July 2015.14

The Government has encouraged other schemes to use London and

low, as they have already been share their knowledge and exper- This briefing note summarises the developing a pool and reducing tise on all different asset classes reforms to the LGPS and high-This costs. formed on the basis that both are be unbalanced with fewer repre- criteria scale, cost, governance like-minded schemes which have sentatives from the smaller and infrastructure. As the implea similar market outlook. Howev- schemes. er, London and Lancashire will still need to expand their collective There are also other possible struc- main unanswered

equal control over the pool.

ure.

Internal investment manage- control over the pool. ment expertise

vestments. It will be beneficial for term.

## **Chart 5: Main questions** arising from the reforms

- How much will the cost savings deal with the wider issues of the LGPS?
- What is the right size for each pool?
- What happens if the funds do not share the same outlook?
- What is the balance between active and passive investment management so as to deliver value for money for members?
- How will state social responsibility interact with the fiduciary duty of the scheme?
- What is the potential impact of little or no flexibility for funds to move to another pool once the system is fully operational?

Lancashire as an example to fol- experts from each authority to Conclusion

partnership was however, the decisions made may lights the key areas within the

if they are to exceed the £25bn fig- tures, such as regional, which These questions need to be caresome appear to be considering (for fully considered to ensure scheme example the South West) and 'one members do not lose out overall Schemes such as London and Lan- large, many small'. In this in- from any decisions made. cashire can benefit from partner- stance, not all the schemes are of a ships by sharing their expertise similar size. Arrangements to The next steps taken by the local and knowledge while maintaining manage these relationships may authorities will be to prepare be more complex as decisions will their pooling proposals and look be required over the weighting of to secure their partnerships and

The Government encourage in- Once the six funds are set up, it is ther announcements in the March house investment management to unclear what choice or flexibility 2016 Budget where the Governdeliver the cost savings set out in to move to another pool the funds ment will respond to the consulthe reforms. The pooling arrange- will have. It is also unclear as to tation on revoking and replacing ment could have significant effect what impact this might have on the management regulations. on the management of pooled in- member outcomes in the long-

mentation of the changes happen, there are questions that still re-(Chart 5).

begin structural transition into 6 pools. It is likely there will be fur-

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-and-london-pensions-partnership-to-go-

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